

APEX: Governed Enterprise AI Gateway

Safely enabling enterprise AI capabilities through policy, identity, audit, and zero-trust enforcement.

The Problem

Uncontrolled AI Capability Access Is Becoming Enterprise Risk







Note: Enterprise risk problem exists for MCP, AI agents, APIs, copilots, workflows, and AI tooling

References: TechCrunch (May 2023), CVE-2025-68143/68144/68145 (Cyata, Jan 2026), EU AI Act Art. 99 (Reg. 2024/1689, as amended by the Digital Omnibus, 8 Jul 2026), Cisco State of AI Security 2026

Real-World Examples of the Problem Set

Uncontrolled AI capability access is now enterprise risk

Two incidents bookend the change. One was an employee mistake. The other was the protocol itself.

INCIDENT 1 · MARCH 2023 — samsung

Samsung leaks source code into ChatGPT

Three separate incidents in 20 days at Samsung's semiconductor division. Engineers pasted source code, meeting transcripts, and equipment defect identification code into ChatGPT to debug, optimize, and summarize.

What it cost

- Proprietary semiconductor code in third-party training data
- Internal meeting content outside the firewall
- Company-wide ban on generative AI (April 2023)
- Reputational and competitive exposure that is irreversible

The mechanism was an employee using a public tool. No malice. No vulnerability. Just unrestricted capability access.

INCIDENT 2 · JANUARY 2026 — mcp-server-git

Three CVEs in Anthropic's own MCP server

CVE-2025-68143, 68144, 68145. Cyata researchers showed that a malicious README, GitHub issue, or webpage could trigger code execution, file deletion, or context injection. No credentials required.

What it means

- The protocol creator's own server had injection surface
- Indirect prompt injection bypasses identity entirely
- Affected every release before December 8, 2025
- The same class of flaw exists across the MCP ecosystem

The mechanism was the protocol itself. The vendor wrote it. The vendor missed it. Every adopter inherits the risk.

The pattern between them

In 2023, an employee was the attack surface. In 2026, the protocol is. Both share one root cause: enterprises gave AI access to enterprise capabilities without a governance layer to mediate it.

85%+	13.4%	29%
Adaptive prompt-injection success against tested coding agents	Of audited agent skills had critical-level security flaws	Of enterprises ready to secure agentic AI deployments

Sources: Bloomberg (May 2023), TechCrunch (May 2023). Cyata / Infosecurity Magazine (Jan 2026): CVE-2025-68143, CVE-2025-68144, CVE-2025-68145. Cisco State of AI Security 2026. ClawHub agent skills audit (2026).

It is not one MCP server. It is every AI surface.

MCP is the newest capability source, not the only one. Governance scoped to a single class covers almost nothing.

Embedded copilots

Every Office, Teams, Outlook, and Excel seat. Deployed by licence, not by project.

Agents and orchestrators

Multi-step, autonomous, and able to call one another without a human in the loop.

MCP servers and connectors

Tool registries wiring models directly into systems of record.

SaaS AI features

CRM, ITSM, HR, and ERP vendors shipping AI into products you already own.

Developer tooling

Code assistants with repository, pipeline, and secret-store access.

Browser and endpoint AI

Extensions and assistants that read whatever is on the authenticated screen.

API and RPA integrations

Automation that now routes decisions through a model.

Shadow AI

Unsanctioned tools on personal accounts. Invisible to every control above.

Each row above is a capability source. Every one of them can be handed enterprise credentials, and most arrive without a security review because they ship inside something already approved.

The governance consequence

A control that sits inside any one of these classes cannot see the others. The only place that sees all of them is the boundary they must cross to reach data.

APEX registers capability sources regardless of class. An unregistered source is denied by default, whatever shipped it.

Copilot did not add a tool. It added a surface to every desk.

Which splits the problem in two. How often something hostile arrives, and how far it gets once it does.

1 · ARRIVAL IS A VOLUME PROBLEM

You cannot inventory your way out of this one.

Deployed by licence, not by project.

Copilot arrives in Word, Excel, Outlook, Teams and PowerPoint on every seat that has the SKU. Nobody filed a project request.

Everything it reads is a potential instruction.

Documents, email bodies, calendar invitations, shared files, web pages. Injection is text, and text is the input.

At enterprise volume, arrival is a rate.

The question stops being whether hostile instructions ever reach a model and becomes how often, and who is holding the session when they do.

2 · BLAST RADIUS IS A DESIGN PROBLEM

A copilot runs as the user. Its reach is that user's entitlements.

So the aggregate reach of per-seat AI is the union of what every employee can already open. AI did not create the over-permissioning. It made it queryable in plain language.

And chains extend it further

Surface types (N)	Resources (R)	Within 3 hops
8	20	8,000
25	60	865,500

N counts capability types, not seats. Seats multiply arrival, not paths.

Only one of these two has a technical fix

You cannot stop hostile text from arriving, and any vendor promising that is selling you something. What you can decide is what a model is permitted to do the moment it believes it. That decision has to live somewhere every call crosses.

Path figures are an illustrative ceiling, not measured data: N·R + N(N-1)·R + N(N-1)(N-2)·R, capped at three hops for legibility. The unconstrained ceiling is orders of magnitude higher. Exact figures depend on how permissive the topology is; the shape of the curve does not.

Why NOW?

Four pressures converging in 2026

AI capability access went from research curiosity to enterprise-wide risk in eighteen months.

MCP proliferation

Nov 2024 → today

Model Context Protocol went from launch to industry standard in 18 months. Microsoft, OpenAI, Google, AWS, and dozens of dev tools now support it.

Documented incidents are now monthly

Q1 2026

Three CVEs in Anthropic's own Git MCP server (Jan 2026). Gemini hijacked through calendar invitations. Copilot session hijacking via Reprompt attack.

EU AI Act: the clock moved, the obligation did not

Aug 2, 2026

Digital Omnibus signed 8 July 2026. High-risk deferred to Dec 2027 and Aug 2028. Article 50 transparency still applies 2 Aug 2026. Penalties reach €35M or 7% of turnover.

Boards are asking, CISOs are unprepared

Cisco 2026

Most enterprises plan to deploy agentic AI, while only 29% report being prepared to secure those deployments.

The window

Capability is here. Incidents are public. The high-risk deferral is runway, not relief. Enterprises will build governance inside this window or retrofit it under deadline.

Sources: Cyata (Jan 2026), CVE-2025-68143/68144/68145. Regulation (EU) 2024/1689 as amended by the Digital Omnibus, signed 8 July 2026. Cisco State of AI Security 2026.

The APEX Architecture



Governance Layers

What Each Layer Actually Enforces

A single tool call is checked five times before it touches data.



Defense in depth, not defense by one prompt rule.

Each layer answers a different question. A jailbroken model can't talk its way past layer 3 (Entra) or layer 4 (RBAC) — those don't read English. And layer 5 means even a successful call leaves a record.



APEX Security Model

- ✓ Unregistered Servers DENIED
- ✓ Unapproved Tools DENIED
- ✓ NO direct credentials
- ✓ Managed identity ONLY
- ✓ Audit MANDATORY
- ✓ Least privilege ENFORCED

Approved Vs Rogue Server

Rogue MCP Server



Approved MCP Server

Entitlement Matrix

User	SQL	Blob	Outlook	Web
FinanceBot	read	read	internal-only	none
SalesAgent	read	none	external email	approved domains
RogueServer	denied	denied	denied	denied

LIVE EVIDENCE

APEX in action

Working software, not slideware. Each surface below maps to a deployed APEX capability.

1 Tool registration — apex.console

Register new MCP server

name: corp-crm-agent
origin: mcp://corp-crm-agent.internal
owner: data-platform-team
tools: customer_lookup, order_status

→ Submitted for approval

Every MCP server entering the enterprise is named, owned, and scoped before it can call anything.

2 Approval workflow — queue.apex

corp-crm-agent PENDING REVIEW

Risk tier: Medium
Data scope: Customers (read-only)
Approver: Security Officer

Approve | Deny | Hold

Human-in-the-loop approval by Security before any MCP server reaches production data.

3 Audit trail — log.apex

```
14:22:01 PASS corp-crm-agent → customer_lookup(1842)
14:22:09 PASS corp-crm-agent → order_status(7821)
14:22:14 DENY unverified-7f3a → read_db(*)
14:22:18 PASS finance-bot → ledger_query(Q3)
14:22:25 FLAG corp-crm-agent → bulk_export
```

Immutable record of every AI tool call with identity, policy result, and full payload.

4 Policy enforcement — policy.apex

ReadOnlyMediumRisk

Read operations	ALLOW
Write operations	DENY
Bulk export (>1000 rows)	REQUIRE APPROVAL
PII fields	MASK
Rate limit	100 / min

Granular policy tiers map MCP servers to allowed operations, data scope, and quotas.

APEX In Action

Screenshots

Register Tool

Tool Name

customer_lookup

Display Name

Customer Lookup

Description

Lookup customer by ID through governed SQL endpoint

Backend Path

/tool/sql/customer/{customer_id}

Resource Type

Azure SQL

Resource Name

Customers

Access Type

read-only

Risk Level

medium

Register Tool

Create Policy Template

Policy Name

ReadOnlyMediumRiskCustom

Risk Level

medium

Rate Limit Per Minute

30

Requires JWT ☑

Requires Audit ☑

Allow After Hours ☑

Allow Writes ☐

Allow Bulk Export ☐

Create Policy Template

Audit Trail


```
{
  "count": 20,
  "events": [
    {
      "audit_event_id": 20,
      "timestamp_utc": "2026-05-16 19:03:03.550270",
      "tool_name": "read_blob_document",
      "resource_accessed": "Azure Blob: documents/demo.txt",
      "access_model": "managed_identity_governed_blob_endpoint",
      "status": "success"
    },
    {
      "audit_event_id": 19,
      "timestamp_utc": "2026-05-16 19:02:56.423734",
      "tool_name": "sql_customer_lookup",
      "resource_accessed": "Azure SQL: Customers/1",
      "access_model": "managed_identity_governed_sql_endpoint",
      "status": "success"
    },
    {
      "audit_event_id": 18,
      "timestamp_utc": "2026-05-16 08:24:09.811893",
      "tool_name": "create_policy_template",
      "resource_accessed": "Policy Template: ReadOnlyMediumRiskCustom",
      "access_model": "admin_policy_workflow",
      "status": "created"
    },
    {
      "audit_event_id": 17,
      "timestamp_utc": "2026-05-16 08:22:25.999711",
      "tool_name": "approve_tool",
      "resource_accessed": "Tool Registry: ToolId 1",
      "access_model": "admin_approval_workflow",
      "status": "approved"
    },
```


Registered Tools / Approval Flow

Refresh Tools

ID	Tool	Display	Backend	Resource	Risk	Status	Action
11	customer_lookup	Customer Lookup	/tool/sql/customer/{customer_id}	Azure SQL: Customers	medium	pending	Approve

Policy Templates

Refresh Policy Templates

ID	Name	Risk	JWT	Audit	Rate Limit	Writes	Bulk Export
1	ReadOnlyLowRisk	low	true	true	60	false	false
2	ReadOnlyMediumRisk	medium	true	true	30	false	false
3	HighRiskRestricted	high	true	true	10	false	false
4	ReadOnlyMediumRiskCustom	medium	true	true	30	false	false

Enterprise Value

Enable AI without enabling risk

Enterprise AI fails on governance, not on models. APEX is the governance layer.

Prevent AI data breaches

Unregistered MCP servers and rogue agents cannot reach enterprise data.

Default-deny on every capability source

Satisfy AI audit requirements

Every tool call, identity, and policy decision is logged and queryable.

SOC 2, HIPAA, SOX, EU AI Act ready

Ship AI capabilities faster

Approved MCP servers deploy through a registration workflow, not security review backlog.

Weeks to days for new AI tooling

Control AI consumption

Per-source quotas, rate limits, and policy tiers prevent runaway LLM and data costs.

Spend visibility per agent, tool, and policy

The enterprise position

Without governance, AI is either blocked by security or deployed with hidden risk. APEX is the layer that lets the enterprise say yes.

Contact

APEX

Enterprise AI without governance is enterprise risk without controls.

APEX is the layer between AI capability and enterprise data.

LIVE DEMO

`opschainai.com`

Working APEX reference architecture, governing MCP servers against real enterprise data sources.

Live demo

See APEX deny a rogue MCP server in real time against a working enterprise data source.

Pilot scoping

Two-week engagement to map your AI capability surface and define a governance baseline.

Technical briefing

Deep dive on the architecture, threat model, and governance layers for your security team.

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What happens next.

Three ways in, with three different levels of commitment. Most teams start with the first.

01

Technical briefing

60 minutes · No cost

Architecture, threat model, and the five governance layers, walked through with your security team. You leave with a view of your own capability surface.

02

Live controls walkthrough

Roughly 10 minutes · No cost

Watch security-trimmed retrieval, the DLP boundary, and deterministic data access run against a working source. Including the audit records you would hand an examiner.

03

Governance assessment

2 to 3 weeks · Fixed fee

Capability surface map, governance gap analysis, the top workflows ranked by value against risk, and a 30-day pilot scope with defined success criteria.

The ask

Book the briefing. Bring whoever owns security review, because they are the person this is built for.

opschainai.com

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